delight (its pleasant counterpart), uneasiness is the key to understanding how passions work in the Lockean model of mind. Addison takes a conservative interpretive line, and his conceptualization is in keeping with what Peter Schouls identifies as the moral backbone of Lockean passions: namely, they exist to drive one toward the "moral Truths" exposed by rational reflection. 4 It also coincides with Alan McKenzie's assertion that The Spectator's mission was to teach readers how to train their passions so as to better bring them into company. 5 Addison treats the passions as if their uneasy feelings are encoded communications from God that only need to be judged correctly. By contrast, Steele's interpretation of the uneasy nature of emotional experience turns on a more skeptical reading of Lockean empiricism, and his essays on envy and grief expose the indeterminacy that resides at the heart of a modern epistemological model of the passions. Thus, my argument operates on the assumption that within the normative eighteenth-century view of the passions as a controllable, if enigmatic, conduit to psychological self-mastery there lies a necessary kernel of affective susceptibility, a capacity for being moved by our feelings that has value, in and of itself. In essence, Addison's essays downplay the affective implications of modern emotional experience while Steele's essays accentuate them. Before going further, however, it is important to situate this argument within the philosophical history of "the passions," for when Locke, Addison, and Steele take up the question of emotion, they do so fully aware of the long line of Western thought preceding them. 6 THE HISTORY OF MODERN PASSIONS: FROM "DISEASE" TO "UNEASINESS" Describing conceptual shifts across time in terms of binaries is always risky, especially when those concepts are loosely analogous to either side of the ancient/modern divide. I run that risk here, in part, because the passions have always invited binary comparison-Plato posited passion as an oppositional force to reason, for instance. More important than historical precedent is the fact that the passions function as a special limit case. Their central trope of instability inherently maintains a fluid, permeable border between the seemingly polar oppositions that are often employed to define them. Lexicographically, "the passions" is a term of mainly classical import. 7 Classical passions are ungovernable, external, extra-rational determinants of the human will; their source is certain, and their effects are immediate-Cupid with his quiver of arrows is their poster-boy. The modern, and our own contemporary, counterpart to "the passions" is emotion, a fully rational and internalized psychological concept. 8 Susan James's work on this subject in the field of early modern studies has explored the shift from classical passion to modern emotion through the corollary binary of passivity and activity, wherein passivity is the capacity to be acted upon or to be changed by an agent, and activity is the capacity to be an agent, to have the power to act upon or change something else. 9 James describes the classical relationship between a subject and his/her passions as one of passivity: we are passive with regard to our passions because they function as "forces that are at once extremely powerful and actually or potentially beyond our control." 10 The modernizing move comes when empirical models of epistemology begin to insist that emotional feelings are predicated upon active, cognitive functions and are, thus, within the subject's realm of responsibility. The most significant implication of James's work, however, lies in her analysis of instances where the passive/active and classical/modern binaries become unstable.
Ralph Cudworth, the esteemed Cambridge Platonist, asserted that "this passion of the soul in sensation [is not] a mere naked passion or suffering; because it is a cogitation or perception which hath something of active vigor in it." 11 Cudworth here puts his finger on the crux of the tradition that eighteenthcentury writers will inherit. The newly modern view retains an element of passivity in the sense that objects of perception engage our capacity to be moved, but subjects can never be merely passive because the patient has some cognitive role to play in how those feelings are registered and the degrees to which they are acted upon.
12 Through this lens, early modern thought envisioned a new model of emotion where it is the case that "passion is not just something experienced passively, but that passionate experiences . . . contain in themselves a ratiocinative element . . . that they are in themselves a form of cognition." 13 Cudworth's representation of early modern thinking also demonstrates the fluidity of evolutionary adjustments involving constructs of emotion, for the shift from passivity to activity did not, in itself, divest the passions of their disruptive potential; it merely reconfigured an external force as an internal one. As such, when it comes to emotional experience, theoretical binaries seem to function more like negotiations.
When Locke weighs in on the passions, he creates another binary relationship by presenting their agitational component in terms of "uneasiness," as opposed to their much more common formulation as "diseases of the mind" that one finds in Robert Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy (1621).
14 It is worth briefly exploring the comparison between Locke and Burton to illustrate the importance of the cautiously negotiated shift from early modern passions-asdisease to modern passions-as-uneasiness.
Burton's conceptualization of melancholy as disease is closely contingent on passivity, for it is a condition wherein one is subject to the whims of irrational emotions, and it is rooted in a faulty imagination that turns agents into patients. 15 Because melancholics are ever in danger of having their reason overcome by their passions, the doctor of melancholy is pitted against ancient foes of sorrow and fear in order to save his patient from utter dissolution. Burton's passions are figured as adversarial actors that must be held at bay. Sorrow is not a feeling but a "poysoned worme, consuming body and soule, and gnaw-ing the very heart" 16 and fear "an assistant and a principall agent in procuring of this mischiefe," a sad "monster," and a "fowle fiend." 17 As both symptom and cause of melancholy, there's an overriding sense that the passions need to be remedied, rectified, or extirpated in order to cure the disease.
Burton, however, also demonstrates a curious illustration of the modernizing intersection of James's passivity and activity by positing melancholy as an irrational passion, the result of faulty imagining. In this formulation, cognitive function must play a role in how passions are translated from sensation to action. If, as Angus Gowland explains, The Anatomy presents melancholics as "irrationally fearful and sad about things, because their rational power did not overrule their crazed fantasies," and if it is the case that there is such a thing as a rational passion (that for which one has good reason to be affected), then the best prevention would be to strengthen one's ability to correctly judge the difference between the two. 18 Thus, even within Burton's classically rooted system, passivity and activity perform overlapping conceptual functions, and this overlap is the site at which Burton's Anatomy "is a bridge between medieval and modern thought." 19 The same questions of passivity and activity-of compulsion, of will, and of the understanding's role in regulating the passions-are at issue in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. While it is easy to see the ways Locke's work functions as a corrective to that which came before, it would be a mistake to suggest that he resolves, in one fell swoop, the classical/modern, immediate/ mediate, external/internal, passive/active conflicts embedded in the epistemological tradition that his legacy would eventually upend. The subtle but important distinction is that when Locke introduces a metaphorical "uneasiness" to replace "disease" as the fundamental component of emotional experience, the tension between passivity and activity still remains even as the balance of power shifts to the active processes of rational thought.
Jonathan Kramnick has most recently addressed this conundrum of modern feelings by illustrating how the Lockean framework for explaining human motivation changed substantially between An Essay's first and second editions (1690 and 1694, respectively). 20 Influenced by his now-famous correspondence with William Molyneux, Locke backpedaled from the original position that knowledge of the "external verities" of good and evil is the provocation that determines the will. The revisions he made in the second edition account for Molyneux's objection that experience (i.e., a feeling of what it is like to be faced with a choice of action) must factor into our desires and, thus, influence our actions upon those desires. In the 1690 edition of Book II, chapter xxi, the greater good "is both a contingent estimation, subject to error, and something that lies outside of us, with lasting consequences for our happiness. In either case, the good has a causal role with respect to our actions." 21 Thus, Locke's initial estimation that "the greater Good is that alone which determines the Will" effectively situates human actors in a position of passivity. 22 The second edition reflects a distinct rethinking of his position and a shift from passive to active articulations of human action. By 1694, it is no longer the good but the mind that determines the will when we feel uneasy upon finding ourselves in an adverse relationship to some good. If in the first formulation we are moved by knowledge of good/evil itself, Locke's "second thoughts" amount to a repositioning wherein "mental states and attitudes have a causal role to play in a person's activity." 23 This renegotiation of the function of mental states (including emotional ones) is illustrative of the provisional nature of passions at the beginning of the eighteenth century.
On the one hand, Locke poses a fundamental challenge to the paradigm of passivity. Agents are no longer held captive to their feelings because they are freed by the mind's ability (power) to assent to or forbear acting upon the desires that uneasiness elicits. In this light, Peter Schouls is correct in arguing that the fail-safe of Lockean emotions is the assumption that subjects are able to "give full reign to . . . the 'master passion': a person's passion for [self-] mastery," and it is only when the mind is "negligently imploid," as Locke puts it in Of the Conduct of the Understanding (1704), that we tend to get carried away by the disease-like violence of our passions. 24 Because uneasiness is internal and controllable, it is foolish for anyone to say he cannot govern his passions if he wills to do so.
On the other hand, uneasiness is not an unproblematic epistemological construct. When Locke posits it as the key to answering the problem of the passions, he leaves emotional experience open to an indeterminacy that would have been unthinkable in a classical context. For the newly modern turn has at its core an unsettled compulsion that can only be glanced at indirectly and must be sorted out by the mind's active reflection-that is, in retrospect. 25 An Essay never resolves the conflict between uneasiness as a solution and uneasiness as a problematic, but the contradiction itself is fruitful. Classical passions were unmistakable because they were figured as immediate-in Humean terms, the classical model assumed a necessary connection between what one felt and the emotion one attached to it. 26 On the whole, Locke's epistemological model lays waste to the construct of immediate perceptions. There are, however, places where An Essay comes down on both sides of the immediate/ mediate divide, and those places, not coincidentally, are also conceptually relevant to his arguments regarding the passions.
The crux of Locke's own cognitive dissonance lies in the question of whether the transmission of ideas through the senses is, at any level, directed by God or if all Lockean ideas come from experience alone. While Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse suggest that Locke's argument against innate ideas also constitutes a fully executed theoretical move, "primarily intent on taking the concepts of good and evil away from God and placing them squarely in the domain of human understanding," when it comes to the passions, this assertion goes one step too far. 27 Even as Locke sets in motion a systematic secular-ization of emotional experience, he problematizes a wholly skeptical reading by maintaining that some qualities are woven into the fabric of sensation. In chapter vii of Book II, for instance, he attributes the immediacy of such communication to "The infinite Wise Author of our being," who:
having given us . . . a power to our Minds in several Instances, to chuse amongst its Ideas, which it will think on, and to pursue the enquiry of this or that Subject with consideration and attention, to excite us to these Actions of thinking and motion, that we are capable of, has been pleased to join to several Thoughts, and several Sensations, a perception of Delight.
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Locke begins from a premise of activity, wherein it is within the power of the mind to choose which of the ideas it will pursue and which it will eschew. As such, the mind judges on its own how to act in relation to the things that move our passions (i.e., objects of sensation). But the power to choose is ultimately preempted by the pleasure of the Deity, who has made sure to hardwire the relationship between "several Sensations" and our perceptions of pleasure/ delight and pain/uneasiness. Thus, the active powers of the mind are underwritten (at least in some instances) by a passive foundation, a deistic fail-safe buried within his empiricist approach to emotional feelings. Certain things must give us pleasure and others must produce pain in order for the system to work without either completely abandoning or wholly resorting to the premise of the first edition-the assumption that our wills are determined by a quasiinnate appreciation for the eternal truths of good and evil. 29 Locke splits the difference in the second edition by maintaining the existence of unquestioned good and evil while asserting that only in a select (but unidentified) set of objects is the relationship immediate, and it is on this account that it has "pleased our Wise Creator" to annex to several Objects, and to the Ideas which we receive from them, as also to several of our Thoughts, a concomitant pleasure, and that in several Objects, to several degrees, that those Faculties which he had endowed us with, might not remain wholly idle, and unemploy'd by us.
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Notice that the pleasure of the deity and one's own pleasure are locked together in a chain of concomitancy from objects, to ideas, to thoughts. The wise creator has endowed objects with his/her pleasure and agents with faculties to discern that pleasure correctly and to act accordingly. Moreover, "Pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on work, that Pleasure has, we being as ready to employ our Faculties to avoid that, as to pursue this." 31 This is significant because Locke identifies an explicit relationship between pleasure and pain, good and evil, and the passions, for "Pleasure and Pain, and that which causes them, Good and Evil, are the hinges on which our Passions turn." 32 On these grounds, one could make the case for an undergirding organization of the feelings of joy and sorrow because God has given us faculties for correctly judging the good/ evil and pleasure/pain inherent in objects. This would be plain if Locke used pleasure/pain and good/evil as the only measures for our ideas of the passions, but he adds a level of abstraction by introducing "uneasiness" and "delight" as loosely analogous to pain and pleasure, respectively. Prior to describing the motivations of the will and causes of human action in chapter xxi, Locke sets aside five pages for a discussion "Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain" (Book II, chapter xx), the intent of which is to explain how simple ideas coalesce to form complex ones, through a process of sensation, reflection, and denomination. 33 All the examples he provides deal with the passions. In chapter xx, the initial sensations that will eventually become our passions "cannot be described, nor their Names defined." 34 As such, what one feels in the agitational moment of uneasiness or delight is never exactly the same as the thing to which one refers with the signifier of love, hate, joy, sorrow, etc.
Take love, for example: "any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the Delight, which any present, or absent thing is apt to produce in him, has the Idea we call Love." 35 While this is offered as a self-explanatory definition, the full extent of the conceptual model it suggests is only evident after some unpacking. Note that Locke's "love" is not a passion in the classical sense of an immediate perception; it is a name for the endpoint of a logical process wherein a thing (by virtue of its presence, if good, or absence, if evil) triggers in us an "internal Sensation" as we reflect upon the quality of the thing and our relationship to it, "for when a Man declares in Autumn, when he is eating them, or in Spring, when there are none, that he loves Grapes, it is no more, but that the taste of Grapes delights him; let an alteration of Health or Constitution destroy the delight of their Taste, and he then can be said to love Grapes no longer." 36 In the case of sorrow, the relationship is stated more directly: "Sorrow is uneasiness in the Mind, upon the thought of a Good lost, which might have been enjoy'd longer; or the sense of a present Evil." 37 The indescribable moment of delight/uneasiness in either case is prioritized as the impetus that compels us to "form to ourselves the Ideas of our Passions." 38 In Locke's analysis, love and sorrow are expressly not agents that direct our action; they are instead the names we use for coming to terms with the agitational uncertainties inherent to experience itself, and we only know what to call the uneasiness after we have assembled the associational relationships that allow us to make a determination. If the "Wise Author of our being" has, indeed, predetermined the quality that one is supposed to receive from the things that move the passions (and Locke never rules out the possibility that he has), there's no way to tell, at the point of agitational uneasiness/delight, what it is. Only after the faculties of understanding and will are employed can one recognize the idea that uneasiness harbors (a lost good or apparent evil) and assign to it an emotional appellation-"love" or "sorrow."
The Lockean mode I describe is the modern epistemological procedure for how emotions work-from sensation to denomination, by way of reflection. Yet, this summative evaluation is not the most important consequence of paying closer attention to Locke's theory of emotion in Book II, chapter xx, for implicit within the process of passion's modern logic is its problematic dependence upon uneasiness as an indeterminate agitation that, nonetheless, determines the will to form for itself the meaning and nature of things. In that fraught relationship between the freedom of uneasiness and the strictures of rational judgment, passivity and activity lose something of their polar opposition as agents become patients and patients assume agency. Moreover, emotional experiences lose their distinguishing "feels" in the reflexive relationship of delight/uneasiness; it is now not only possible but also natural for emotions to overlap under extreme conditions.
In turning to analyze The Spectator as a pivotal text for observing the development of eighteenth-century theorizations of the passions, we might also rephrase the question of this inquiry to better reflect the implications of Locke's modal uneasiness, for An Essay's paradoxical denial and admission of the fluidity of emotional experience is apropos of the problem that eighteenth-century writers faced in dealing with the passions. The question we must ask, then, is: How much attention should one pay to the "sticky entanglements" of affect that are laced into early/modern evocations of the passions? 39 And further: What does one lose, or gain, by ignoring them? What does one gain, or risk, by taking their measure? In the remaining pages, I will offer The Spectator as one example of how those questions were being asked and essayed in the popular prose of early eighteenth-century England.
THE SPECTATOR AND MODERN PASSIONS
In his introduction to the Clarendon edition of The Spectator, Donald Bond privileges Addison's contributions over those of Steele because, he claims, more of Addison's essays contained original content (rather than reprinted letters from readers) and his writing was of a superior quality. 40 In favoring the high-spirited and comedic air of Addison's prose, Bond presents Steele's serious and straightforward style as indicative of his limited rhetorical ability. For the purposes of the present argument, however, Addison's supposed literary superiority actually makes him the author of lesser concern because the preferment of fluency and humor to scrupulous questioning and laborious elaboration also places distinct limitations on Addison's approach to investigating the passions. My intent is to perform a rhetorical analysis of the distinction between Addison and Steele that will enable us to reevaluate Steele's Spectator contributions in light of his theoretical claims on the passions. While Addison establishes a baseline for understanding mainstream eighteenth-century views on the subject, Steele's essays on jealousy and grief are significant for their willingness to tarry with the impossible task of putting the passions' agitational instability into words.
Addison's essays on the passions are intended as spirited diversions rather than theoretical inquiries, and this is illustrated in a satire upon coquettes often referred to as "The Passions of the Fan." The essay, No. 102, consists of an epistolary fiction, ostensibly penned by the headmistress of "an Academy for the training up of young Women in the Exercise of the Fan, according to the most fashionable Airs and Motions that are now practised at Court." 41 Through mock military drills, she trains aspiring courtiers "in the Use of their Arms," and as the ladies handle, unfurl, discharge, ground, and recover their fans, the essay takes aim at modish obsessions with "foppish and fantastic Ornaments" by comparing strict observance of social protocol to the skill and trade of a marksman. 42 However, this whimsical farce also contains a model for Addison's theory of the passions, for the main function of the headmistress's academy is to teach coquettes how to communicate their internal sensations with deadly accuracy. This skill is mastered by producing and interpreting "The Fluttering of the Fan," and she indicates the primary value of her pedagogy through a hermeneutics of self-discipline. 43 Students are taught to assume a deliberate relationship between the fan's "flutters" and the passions they represent. "There is," Addison ventriloquizes, "an infinite Variety of Motions to be made use of in the Flutter of a Fan: There is the angry Flutter, the modest Flutter, the timorous Flutter. . . . There is scarce any Emotion in the Mind which does not produce a suitable Agitation in the Fan; insomuch, that if I only see the Fan of a diciplin'd Lady, I know very well whether she laughs, frowns, or blushes." 44 Most significantly, the education in question is not so much about the fan as instrument but, rather, about the passions it is assumed to communicate. Where the uninitiated see an infinite variety of motions, the well-trained eye perceives a litany of specific, objective relays of emotion. Like Addison's tireless attention to improving his style, which, as Bond has it, "attained . . . the perfect adaptation of language to subject-matter without too obvious effect," the disciplined young lady can achieve an agitation of her fan to match the subject-matter of her mind. 45 What's most at stake in No. 102 is the ability to adjudicate properly the emotion that lies hidden in any extreme disturbance of the mind, and, thus, within Addison's essays on the passions, what that disturbance is, per se, is beside the point.
If an outline of Addison's position exists in "The Passions of the Fan," its full figure is more evident in Spectator No. 170, on jealousy, where the difference between chaos and order, when it comes to the passions, rests in the difference between misrecognition and viewing "Truth nakedly." 46 No. 170 extends the theme of self-training through an illustration of the peculiar characteristics that manifest in the jealous man's mind and the dangers that result from giving oneself over to them. Not only does the passion destroy marriages and torture those who suffer it, but jealousy also proves to be most pernicious for its being caused by an improper communication between our perceptions and our feel-ings. Thus, "Jealousy is that Pain which a Man feels from the Apprehension that he is not equally beloved by the Person whom he entirely loves," 47 and its danger is attributed to the jealous man's having mistaken "imaginary for real happiness." 48 The sufferer has improperly assumed the foundation of his own happiness to reside in the apprehension of something about which he can never be certain-a perfectly equitable love between himself and his beloved. Not only is his happiness ever in doubt, but every step he takes to rectify his own apprehensions with reality actually results in the inverse of the ends of our passions, as Locke would have them, for the jealous man consistently avoids pleasure to pursue pain.
Most heinous of all, jealousy has a fundamental misrecognition at its root, for "if we consider the effects of this Passion, one would rather think it proceeded from an inveterate Hatred than an excessive Love." 49 Its nagging malignancy lies in its potential to dissimulate the difference between love and hate. Like an interloping spirit reminiscent of Burton's melancholy via demonic possession, jealousy interferes with a person's otherwise-unimpeded motive for action, and therefore it brings us pain by improperly converging incompatible emotional states into a monstrous hybrid. 50 The analysis of No. 170 takes for granted that passions are derived from fundamentally distinct "flutters" of feeling, and if we were to imagine a theory of the passions, that premise would be its underlying assumption. 51 Addisonian jealousy has love as its primary cause, and it is only by miscalculation that it has the appearance of hatred. The responsibility falls upon the jealous man to discipline his mind to "enlighten the Understanding and rectify the Passions." 52 By comparison, Steele's take on the passions provides a stark theoretical contrast, for rather than training readers to sense "properly," he merely asks them to pay attention to their mental processes at moments of extreme disturbance. In Spectator No. 19, on envy, Steele takes up an investigation that is similar to Addison's consideration of jealousy, but he is more determined to avoid dependence upon preconceived emotional concepts and examine only the empirical evidence. Rather than consulting "the many excellent Things which one might collect out of Authors upon this miserable Affection," No. This bears a resemblance to the analysis of Addison's No. 170 in the sense that the envious man's pain stems from a complete inversion of seemingly opposite emotional states. The important difference is that No. 19 accepts, as an observed fact, that the envious man is "incapable of rejoicing in another's Merit or Success." 54 As a result, Steele does not pose the problem of the passions in terms of appropriately manifesting an intransigent truth of experience; instead, he provides a more complicated consideration, one where the pains of envy arise from an incongruous relationship between feelings and normative "oughts." Although the commentary of No. 19 does not contest the social conventions that establish youth, beauty, valor, and wisdom as worthy of approbation, they are also not its main focus. Steele, rather, centers the essay on a discussion of how the pain of envy works through a signature inversion wherein what ought to cause the envious man pleasure actually causes him pain. Consequently, No. 19 calls into question a necessary relationship between things, perceptions, and passions.
Here Steele offers a counter to Addison's interpretation of the Lockean morality that undergirds experience, for Locke, too, takes into consideration instances where we find our sense of "relish" to be out of calibration. The envious man is in the most "Apostate State" not because he misdirects his esteem so that it mimics contempt, but because his perception of the figure that others approve does cause him pain and that pain does move him to hatred. On this level, Steele echoes Locke's assertion that "the relish of the mind . . . may be alter'd; and 'tis a mistake to think, that Men cannot change the displeasingness, or indifferency, that is in actions, into pleasure and desire, if they will do but what is in their power." 55 While Steele doesn't quibble with the idea that one could train oneself to readjust one's sense of pleasure or desire, the general inquiry of his essays is more cautious on the question of whether or not one ought to do so. Again, taking a Lockean tack, one must look inward, not to social convention, to find the answer.
Locke warns that "Fashion and the common Opinion having settled wrong Notions, and education and custom ill habits, the just values of things are misplaced, and the palates of Men corrupted." 56 So we must rectify our palates not according to what "custom has endear'd" but to what we judge, without prejudice, to be in service of the "greatest apparent good." 57 Achieving such a level of understanding, as I have shown above, would require an attunement to the intrinsic good or evil in things which reveals the "inexorable law of being" underwritten by the pleasure of God. 58 This is the point at which Steele's inquiries diverge from Addison's, via Locke. While Addison, Steele, and Locke all share a distrust of "Fashion and the common Opinion," Steele places more value on testing what it feels like to experience happiness and misery than on deriving judgments of human action from those feelings. When he turns his attention to grief, we get a full picture of how he imagines passions to function within the newly interrogated space between agitation and motivation.
In a letter signed by "B.D." that makes up half of Spectator No. 95's content, the writer asks Mr. Spectator to "enter into the Matter [of mourning] more deeply" and comment on those "who prescribe Rules and Fashions to the most solemn Affliction." 59 Since there is no reply from Mr. Spectator, the letter stands alone as its own commentary on the subject, and B.D.'s request makes plain the risk we run when social norms codify responses to deeply personal experiences. The essay implies that when all of the social capital of mourning is attached to predetermined sets of physical reactions, there is little incentive to contemplate what actually passes in the mind and, thus, the very concept of passion is reduced to superficiality. No. 95 asks us instead to pay attention to what is beneath the injunction to adjudicate properly the relationship between one's feelings and behaviors. After calling into question the supposedly immediate link of sorrow to tears, B.D. finds his own occasion to dive deeper than the "common Sense the ordinary People have." 60 Citing the authority of scientific disciplines, B.D. asserts: "Experience has told us nothing is so fallacious as this outward Sign of Sorrow; and the natural History of our Bodies will teach us, that this Flux of the Eyes, this Faculty of weeping is peculiar only to some Constitutions." 61 B.D.'s observation that the quintessential nature of the passions is most evident at their point of greatest excess is the heart of Steele's model.
By employing more than cautionary rhetoric, B.D.'s observation calls attention to the conundrum underlying modern conceptions of emotion: How can we account for the anomalous uneasiness that inheres in the passions, one that the "natural History of our Bodies" has always made known to us but that philosophy has never explained? The point I want to emphasize here is that, precisely because of their inherently disruptive quality, our passions allow us to access a feature of experience that is "profound" because it is intensely felt and at the same time ineffable. It is not translatable into outward shows or descriptive language until it loses something of its intensity. Moreover, the act of experiencing a passion is a split event such that the articulable feelings of "joy" and "sorrow" precipitate from an imbricated, ur-state of mental activity where both are drawn from the same turbulent source. The distinctions between them only develop through the process of assessment and categorization.
To emphasize the departure of this view from Addison's, the theorization of No. 95 challenges altogether the idea that the structure of experience has been organized according to "Final Causes" that allow us to "naturally [and thus immediately] delight" in the perception of some objects and "naturally" be disgusted with others. 62 Most importantly, rather than skipping over the difficult indeterminacy posed by the Lockean formulation of uneasiness, Steele's illustration does well to draw out its more radical implications.
Locke pays special attention to the passions because, unlike more visceral modes of pleasure and pain, the ideas we have of them are a product of both sensation and reflection-they invite us to "reflect on our selves, and observe how [ 63 Thus, the value Locke places on the passions in Book II, chapter xx, is tied to their function as a problematic, for they resist categorization in terms of a simple immediacy and demand a more thorough investigation into the interplay between sensation and idea. Locke attempts to describe the mental processes through which "we form to our selves the Ideas of our Passions" because doing so is one step toward attaining "the highest perfection of intellectual nature"; An Essay must therefore take on the first challenge as a primer for the second. 64 In the preface to chapter xx, Locke emphasizes the tension between sensual intensity and cognition to which Spectator No. 95 alludes by presenting what we might call unqualified experience as integral to perception itself: "For as in the Body, there is Sensation barely in it self, or accompanied with Pain or Pleasure; so the Thought, or Perception of the Mind is simply so, or else accompanied also with Pleasure or Pain." 65 Though Locke gives little indication of what the barest sensation or the simplest perception might be, he is clear on what they are not: "These like other simple Ideas cannot be described, nor their Names defined; the way of knowing them is . . . only by Experience." 66 He goes out of his way to establish an enigmatic moment in the cognitive process where what one receives from the senses is intensely known and at the same time profoundly inexpressible. Such unqualified experience is the kernel of uneasiness around which we form more concrete ideas of our passions through the process of reflection, description, and definition. The kernel itself, however, is nothing more than agitation, bare stimulus, which we immediately "know" and only later come to "understand."
Steele's argument about grief follows from the same logic: what we know can in no way be said to be the same thing as what we show or even articulate with regard to our passions. Yet the most fruitful correlation to be made between Locke's description of the modes of pleasure and pain and a Steelian theory of the passions is that both put more emphasis on the problem of bearing witness to the simply knowable than on the task of making it conform to what is expressible. In this light, Steele's essays on the passions evince his reluctance to frame them explicitly in terms of The Spectator's (or Locke's, for that matter) dominant mode of self-mastery, for Steele's inquiries signal an entirely different conceptual function of the passions-as an apparatus for bearing witness to our capacity for feeling. As such, they present readers with small nudges that hint more toward exploratory awareness than direct instruction, and essay No. 520 (another take on immoderate grief) stands as a culmination of this theoretical work.
Modeling this essay on a letter from an "F.J." of Norwich (dated Oct. 7th, 1712), Steele enlarges the author's original ideas into a treatise on male widowhood whose take on the act of grieving is quite different from the assessment offered in No. 95. Whereas B.D. complains of the false excesses demonstrated by would-be mourners, F.J. overcomes his fear of "being ridiculous" to admit his frequent crying fits "upon any Circumstance that revives" the memory of his deceased wife. They are especially troublesome for occurring "often, in the midst of Company." 67 Yet F.J. makes no apology for his condition in the original letter, and Steele does not manufacture one in his essay. We find, instead, that candid observation occupies a central position in both texts. Though the details of their accounts differ, both F.J. and Steele depict an inconsolable instance of sorrow, and both are remarkable for their attention to the slippages that occur during excessive emotional stress. The scene is remarkable not only for its depiction of affective extremity but also for how well F.J.'s assessment illustrates the intermediary moment of uneasy, bare sensation that Locke posits between perception and idea. The point that No. 520 absolutely insists upon is that the very same object elicits from F.J. simultaneous and seemingly opposite emotional responses, and Steele will illustrate in the conclusion that there is a virtue in being able to feel deeply such a disparity, even to the point of excess. For to do so is also to recognize that happiness itself is unachievable without sorrow; the full measure of each is embedded in the other.
The description of F.J.'s paroxysm becomes all the more significant when we map each of the emotional states he addresses (love, sorrow, and joy) onto Locke's definitions of these terms in chapter xx of Book II. Love is the key term at play, for he loves both his living daughter and his deceased wife and he does so in a way that is consistent with Locke's definition as the result of one's "reflecting upon the thought he has of the Delight, which any present, or absent thing is apt to produce in him." 70 However, the simultaneity of presence and absence at work in the letter posits the experience of love as a challenge to the distinction between the categories of both joy and sorrow. Because sorrow is defined as an "uneasiness in the Mind, upon the thought of a Good lost, which might have been enjoy'd longer," his daughter's act of "comfort" fills the condition of sorrow by reminding him of the irrevocable absence of his wife. 71 Yet the very same act also engages the conditions for joy as a "delight of the Mind, from the consideration of the present . . . possession of a Good." 72 The present sensation of his daughter's embrace is simultaneously cause for his joy and sorrow because it engages the concept of love on multiple levels, and, importantly, this moment of emotional distress brings about an experiential knowledge that outpaces the mind's capacity for classification.
In this way, Steele takes up the passions not so much in order to make them the proper subject for company but, rather, to test them and, thus, to test the foundations of the relationship between feeling and knowing. The result is somewhat surprising. For if it is a commonplace thesis of epistemology in the wake of Locke' s Essay that what we know ("only by Experience") and what we understand (through the formation of ideas) need not share a fundamental resemblance, Steele highlights the subjective openness that is implicit in the inbetween space of Locke's unqualified experience. Under these conditions, the meaning of F.J.'s grief can only be provisional; subject to circumstantial changes, it must be negotiated continuously: "When she kneels and bids me be comforted, she is my Child; when I take her in my Arms, and bid her say no more, she is my very Wife and is the very Comforter I lament the Loss of." 73 In this provisional exploration of how passions function at the limits of comprehension, the figure of F.J. occupies a theoretically novel space. Neither agent nor patient, exactly, he is instead a participant in a negotiation-one that the classical paradigm could never abide and one that the dominant thread of modern interpretations of the passions would implore him to control. Steele, instead, seems most insistent that there is something to be gained by maintaining an ambivalence of activity and passivity. In admitting the impossibility of finding words to "speak a Motion of the Soul for which there is no Name," F.J. can only wish that his audience could "have a Sense of these pleasing Perplexities." 74 We can only do so if we resist the compulsion to relieve our uneasiness by mastering our thoughts.
Thus, when Steele finally addresses the question of "ought," his answer flies in the face of what every seasoned Spectator reader (and by October, 1712, there were thousands) would have expected. F.J. concludes: "I sate down with a Design to put you [Mr. Spectator] upon giving us Rules how to overcome such Griefs as these; but I should rather advise you to teach Men to be capable of them." 75 On this point, a full challenge to The Spectator's notorious conservatism is palpable, a challenge achieved, nonetheless, on Lockean premises. 76 This injunction seems to suggest that creating a regulatory system for defining and controlling the passions is not only arbitrary but, at best, ethically questionable. Moreover, the end to which F.J. would have us strive (to learn to be capable of extreme sorrow, or joy, or love) cannot be met through training but, rather, only through exposure to the frailties of our own subjective consistency. Spectator No. 520, then, is an aesthetic demonstration of the lesson it asks readers to learn, for it makes an attempt, however feeble, to expose the space of bare sensation as a gesture or a nudge for others to bear witness to the unnamable motions of their own passions. In doing so, we, as readers, might become capable of "pass [ing] through Afflictions in common with all who are in humane Nature." 77 The call for such awareness contains within it seeds of an ethics of feeling, one that is not interpretive but affective, wherein close attention to one's own capacity for sorrow may offer an access point for imagining, without fetishizing, the suffering of others. 78 In sum, it is not enough merely to demonstrate the fact that Addison and Steele represent two, obviously divergent, trajectories of eighteenth-century conceptualizations of the passions. For, while recent scholarship has done well to recognize the "psychological machinery" of the modern self "as the rationalized product of a long history of theorizing the passions," the intricacy of that development has not been sufficiently appreciated. 79 We should, therefore, acknowledge the importance of paying attention to the countervailing narratives embedded within that long history of rationalization, narratives that bear witness to the passions' capacity to be otherwise. Only then do we get a full sense of what it means to talk about "the passions" in the eighteenth century and the theoretically salient implications that arise out of the negotiation between classical and modern epistemology that is implicit when passion is evoked in a newly modern context.
NOTES

